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Bioterrorism Registry
The CDC has set up a free registry program to provide health care workers and public health officials with realtime information to help prepare for and possibly respond to terrorism and other emergency events. Members will receive regular e-mail updates on terrorism and other emergency issues and training opportunities. CDC's new state-of-theart Emergency Operations Center is Mailing address: R.J. Zabransky, 21976 Calverton Rd, Shaker Heights, OH 44122. Tel. and Fax: 216-464-0827. E-mail: germprof@aol.com designed to promote quicker and more coordinated responses to public health emergencies. The center is equipped to handle bioterrorism attacks and will track and respond to disease outbreaks. Registration is available at www.bt.cdc.gov/clinregistry/index.asp.
Study Says States Not Prepared for Emergencies
A study conducted by the nonprofit health advocacy group Trust for America's Health found that only nine of the 50 states met more than half of 10 preparedness targets drawn up by an advisory panel of past and present pub-lic health officials; most states are not ready to handle a biochemical terrorist attack or other public health emergency. The best prepared states, California, Florida, Maryland, and Tennessee, met seven of the 10 preparedness targets, while the least prepared, Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Wisconsin, met only two. Most states met five or fewer; Washington, DC, met only three. States were judged on a variety of targets that included spending 90% of 2002 federal bioterrorism preparedness funds, whether the state had at least one laboratory equipped to handle critical biological agents, whether the state cut public health funding in 2003, and the availability of health care professionals. See the summary at www.signonsandiego. corn/news/nation/terror/20031211-0706security-states-preparedness.html and the CDC website at www.bt.cdc.gov/ for updated information on emergency preparedness.
Bioterrorism
Preparedness to be Graded The CDC has been given the task of working out a grading system so that the federal government can "grade" each state next year on how well it is prepared for bioterrorism and other health emergencies. The CDC implemented the scoring system in January, and full-fledged evaluations will be in effect by summer, 2004. The program especially addresses mass vaccination clinics, even if only "a single case of smallpox occurred anywhere in the world." Since smallpox has been eradicated, if one case emerges, it would have to have come from terrorism. At that point, a mass vaccination program would be set in motion. Other bioterrorist incidents and naturally occurring health emergencies, such as SARS also will be evaluated. Individual state plans must include ways to detect early-warning signs of disease, track outbreaks, train physicians, and communicate with the public. An independent organization will conduct the evaluations, which in part will account for how states have spent about $3 billion in federal funds for preparedness. Details can be seen at www.intelihealth.com/lH/ihtIH/WSIHW 000/92 73/24.524/371700. html or www.healthsafetyinfo.com/content. cfm?content_id=36054.
HIV Testing During Labor and Delivery
To evaluate whether point-of-care rapid HIV testing during labor and delivery expedites the diagnosis of HIV infection in pregnant women, CDC assessed turnaround testing times at three hospitals in Chicago, Illinois, in which obstetric staff performed rapid tests on whole-blood specimens at point of care, and at a fourth hospital in which testing was performed in the hospital laboratory. The results of that analysis indicate that point-of-care rapid testing provided HIV test results faster than laboratory testing, resulting in prompt administration of intrapartum and neonatal antiretroviral prophylaxis. The CDC recommends that individual hospitals should assess the costs and benefits of implementing point-of-care HIV testing. The institution of this test in labor and delivery suites must be done in the context of the restrictions placed upon the use of the test when it was approved, specifically that its use is "restricted to clinical laboratories that have an adequate quality assurance program. 
SARS Vaccine Progressing Quickly
The WHO is collating data on the development of a SARS vaccine. More than 50 leading SARS researchers from 15 countries have concluded that while a safe and effective SARS vaccine would be an important complement to existing control strategies, it will not be available in time should an epidemic recur this year. The group reviewed recent work on experimental vaccines in animals and how that information can be used to initiate future clinical trials in human volunteers. The first clinical trial of an inactivated SARS vaccine will begin in early 2004; however, it is difficult to say when a vaccine might be available. A resurgence of SARS may accelerate the process and result in a vaccine within 2 years. If there is no big outbreak of SARS, then the vaccine will follow the classical development path and would not be ready for 4 to 5 years. Representatives of public institutions and pharmaceutical companies presented reports of progress in the development and evaluation of candidate SARS vaccines. with The Johns Hopkins University announced the design of a number of new compounds that inhibit an enzyme critical to the viability of the SARS virus. The research was sponsored by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The lead compounds inhibit an enzyme (SARS-associated coronavirus protease 3CLpro) that is critical for the replication of the virus. Information from the sequencing of the virus led to the development of successful inhibitors through the use of a proprietary thermodynamics-based molecular design technology, a technology that rapidly and reliably designs drug candidates with exceptionally high specificity and affinity for their targets. The announcement can be seen at www. bioexchange. corn/ news/proteomics.cfm.
New SARS Season
The possibility of a new SARS outbreak in southeast Asia has been suggested, as a case was reported in Taiwan in a resident recently returned from China and two additional cases were reported in mainland China. Meanwhile, U.S. public health officials have prepared to fight SARS if the virus reemerges during the current influenza season. Government researchers are in the process of evaluating several rapid diagnostic tests, as well as developing others. The NIH is working with several companies to develop a SARS vaccine, with the aid of the FDA. The CDC has prepared draft guidelines that would help hospitals react quickly to an epidemic. It has been noted that despite the fact that most U.S. hospitals do not have adequate isolation facilities, they are better prepared for a mass health problem than those in other countries because of the nation's goal of coordinating a response to potential bioterrorist attacks. Details are available at www.infectioncontroltoday.com/ hotnews/39h29121343. html, www.hhs. gov/news/press/2003pres/20030602a. html, and www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/ workplaceguidelines.htm. 
APHA Sets Week for Recognition
The American Public Health Association (APHA) announced that the observance of National Public Health Week (NPHW) will be April 5 to 11, 2004 . The tagline is Eliminating Health Disparities: Communities Moving from Statistics to Solutions. Last year's NPHW was a great success, with events in every state, including the District of Columbia. With the sponsorship of The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the Commonwealth Fund, and the Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation, the organization anticipates that this year will be the most successful yet. To find out more about National Public Health Week 2004, please visit http://www.apha. org/nphw/.
CDC Pushes Anthrax Protocol
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